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Showing posts with label John Haught. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Haught. Show all posts

12/14/10

Know Thyself and Theodore Dalrymple



On the one hand we have some people seeing advances in understanding the brain, mind, and consciousness as holding marvelous possibilities for humankind. On the other, we have those who believe that like all holy grails here is merely hope for one more. Theodore Dalrymple attended a neuropsychiatric conference and listened to smart, brilliant people, and came away with his own ideas about the future of the science of consciousness.

"Neuroscience, it seems to me, is the current most hopeful candidate for the role of putative but delusory answer to all Mankind's deepest questions: what is Man's place in Nature, and how should he live. What is the good life, at least in the western world?" Elsewhere he writes, " But even the most advanced societies are just as full of angst, or poor impulse control, of existential bewilderment, of adherence to clearly irrational doctrines, as ever they were. There is no sign that, Prozac and neurosurgery notwithstanding, any of this is about to change fundamentally."

In thinking about the conference, Dalrymple remembered patients who asked him why they drank so much. Dalrymple spoke to them of statistical correlations between the price of alcohol and the frequency of consumption. This did not satisfy a patient as to why he or she drank.

Dalrymple: "The fact is that, however many factors you examine, you cannot fully explain behaviour, not even relatively simple behaviour. And if you cannot explain relatively simple behaviour, how are we to explain the immense, indeed infinite, variety of human behaviour?"

I recognize that I am jumping from behavior to consciousness, but I believe the corrolary is revealing. In reading Dalrymple I was reminded of a statement by John Haught mentioned in one of my earlier posts. Haught said of Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness that it was only one way to understand. Haught pointed out three ways of looking at a pot of water being heated for tea. (1) Electrons in the water are moving around, becoming increasingly excited or that H2O molecules are transitioning from a liquid to a gaseous state. (2) I turned on the gas burner under the pot. (3) I wanted tea. Dennett's philosophy of consciousness is the kind that belongs to number one, yet there are three points of view for the same phenomenon.

Dalrymple does not speak of three options, but observes that explaining behavior is manifestly complicated. More.

1/30/09

God & Materialism: John Haught, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, On Three Ways of Heating Water


God & Materialism: John Haught, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, On Three Ways of Heating Water

Among other points, theologian John Haught, Georgetown University, says that scientific materialists use a different kind of metaphysics when they claim that life is meaningless, has no purpose, and that the physical is all there is.

As for Richard Dawkins, celebrated evangelist of atheism (The Selfish Gene, et al.), Haught says that Dawkins tricks-out the game. Dawkins starts with "Okay, let's play by the rules. God is a designer, right? Well, then, I win, obviously all the design we see needs no God." John Haught does not understand God quite this simply.

With regard to physicalist Daniell Dennett (Consciousness Explained, among other books), Haught disagrees with Dennett's conception of consciousness, considered by Haught as narrow. Haught's response is that there are three ways of looking at a pot of water being heated for tea. (1) Electrons in the water are moving around, becoming increasingly excited or that H2O molecules are transitioning from a liquid to a gaseous state. (2) I turned on the gas burner under the pot. (3) I wanted tea. Dennett's philosophy of consciousness is the kind that belongs to number one, yet there are three points of view for the same phenomenon.

Here is a Video interview of Haught by Robert Wright. I have opinions, but don't want to prejudice your viewing.